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CONDITION AND VALUE OF REPOSSESSED AUTOMOBILES
* Philip Shuchman
This Article addresses an aspect of the common situation in which
a consumer buys a car at retail on an installment contract: whether,
upon default, the car will be resold for a price that will cover only a
portion of the debt owed, leaving the consumer owing the deficiency.
Data from files provided by the captive financers of automobile
manufacturers to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) show that
the price received when the dealer or financer, as secured party,
repossesses and resells a car is usually far less than the retail price
given by reliable guidebooks and even below the wholesale value.
Most such sales, however, are lawful under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code (UCC). Therefore, the FTC has proposed a rule requiring
the repossessor, whether he chooses to resell the car at wholesale or
retail, to credit the debtor with the actual fair-market retail value,
unless one of the parties can prove the car was in better or worse
than average or normal condition.
This Article examines the usual circumstances of a purchase,
default, repossession, and then resale, along with the typical reme-
dies available to the secured party for reimbursement for the debt
owed on the car loan, which include disposition by resale. Analysis
of a sample of the FTC files revealed how often resales were held in
a retail and wholesale market and what percentages of the debt and
of retail and wholesale values were realized by each type of sale. The
conclusions reached after examining these data support the desira-
bility of the FTC's proposed rule, which would set standards for
prices with which consumers should be credited on resale of their
repossessed cars.
THE LEGAL MODEL
Under the UCC, the retail-installment contract may serve also as
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a security agreement,' with the car as the collateral, classified as
consumer goods. 2 Most often the secured creditor is a financer that
took an assignment of the security agreement as chattel paper from
the automobile dealer that sold the car.3 The usual creditors' reme-
dies upon default appear simple and are generally routinized in the
interest of efficiency. The car as collateral is repossessed and resold,
the resale being the "disposition of the collateral" in UCC jargon.'
The variation in how the proceeds of this sale are distributed is a
crucial factor in calculating whether the creditor can get a defi-
ciency judgment against the debtor,5 the consumer who defaulted
on his installment payments.
1. The relevant Code sections provide that a security interest can be created in an instru-
ment that serves another purpose as well. "'Security agreement' means an agreement which
creates or provides for a security interest." U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(1). The Code says that "[this
Article applies to security interests created by contract including pledge, assignment, chattel
mortgage, chattel trust, trust deed, factor's lien, equipment trust, conditional sale, trust
receipt, other lien or title retention contract and lease or consignment intended as security."
U.C.C. § 9-102(2). Therefore, the sale of a car on installments can be covered by a promissory
note that serves both to give evidence of the debt and to create a security interest in the car.
2. The Code defines collateral as "the property subject to a security interest." U.C.C. § 9-
105(1)(c). The goods sold that serve as collateral are subject to different treatment if they
are classified as consumer goods. The Code explains, "Goods are (1) 'consumer goods' if they
are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes." U.C.C. § 9-
109(1). Thus, most cars sold to individuals will be consumer goods.
3. "'Chattel paper' means a writing or writings which evidence both a monetary obligation
and a security interest in or a lease of specific goods. . . .When a transaction is evidenced
both by such a security agreement or a lease and by an instrument or a series of instruments,
the group of writings taken together constitutes chattel paper." U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b).
4. "A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of the
collateral in its then condition or following any commercially reasonable preparation or pro-
cessing." U.C.C. § 9-504(1).
Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may
be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a
unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but every aspect
of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms must
be commercially reasonable.
U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
5. Both remedies, repossession and suit on the obligation, are available to the creditor
under the Code for successive use against the same debtor.
When a debtor is in default under a security agreement, a secured party has the
rights and remedies provided in this Part [article 9] and except as limited by
subsection (3) those provided in the security agreement. He may reduce his
claim to judgment, foreclose, or otherwise enforce the security interest by any
available judicial procedure. . . .The rights and remedies referred to in this
subsection are cumulative.
U.C.C. § 9-501(1).
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Over the past several years a few studies of the process have found
serious problems in the lawfulness of some aspects of the
repossession-resale-deficiency judgment process and have ques-
tioned the fairness of the regulative laws, even when the particular
practice at issue is lawful.'
A number of variations on the process simpliciter exist, and
changes have been made, some by statute, others by case holdings.
Some financers have changed their practices in the interests of bet-
ter public relations. The variations in the system usually depend on
the contractual relations between the car dealer and the financer to
which the dealer's chattel paper is sold. Sometimes, though not
often, the creditworthiness of the retail-installment buyer affects
these arrangements. The security agreement may be executed di-
rectly to the financer, which then becomes the secured party, with
the car as collateral and the consumer-buyer as debtor. Or the cus-
tomer may sign a security agreement, along with a promissory note,
with the dealer-seller itself as the secured party. If the dealer fi-
nances the sale, it almost always specifies in the contract that it has
the power to assign the security interest and all its attendant rights.
The dealer then usually assigns these retail-installment contracts to
a financer in the form of chattel paper. 7 The terms of the assignment
6. See Shuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and
Resale, 22 STAN. L. REv. 20 (1969) (Connecticut laws); Comment, Business As Usual: An
Empirical Study of Automobile Deficiency Judgment Suits in the District of Columbia, 3
CONN. L. REv. 511 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Business as Usual]; Note, I Can
Get It for You Wholesale: The Lingering Problem of Automobile Deficiency Judgments, 27
STAN. L. REV. 1081 (1975) (California laws) [hereinafter cited as Note, Wholesale].
7. These assignments are permitted under the Code: "Except as otherwise provided in
Section 9-104 on excluded transactions, this Article applies . . . (b) to any sale of accounts
or chattel paper." U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b). Most such security agreements are prepared by the
financers, which provide them for their dealers' use. They contain the printed form of assign-
ment, which need only be signed by the dealer.
The typical legal contractual setting is described in an "Assurance of Discontinuance,"
which is the equivalent of a consent decree, agreed to by GMAC and the Attorney General
of New York, Consumer Frauds and Protection Bureau. General Motors Acceptance Corp.
p. 2 (Nov. 12, 1976).
Most of the sales in New York to be financed by GMAC are executed on a
printed. . . form provided by GMAC, naming the consumer customer as buyer
and the dealer as seller. This form indicates that the contract will be assigned
to GMAC for value and that the dealer or its assignee reserves a security interest
in the'vehicle sold. . ..
Id.
Another example is detailed in the Initial Decision in the recent FTC case involving Ford
Motor Company, Ford Credit Company, and Francis Ford, Inc., a Portland, Oregon dealer.
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may be that the financer has no recourse against the dealer if the
customer defaults or full recourse or any other terms falling on the
spectrum between the two extremes of full and no recourse. In the
full-recourse or full-repurchase arrangement, the dealer is fully re-
sponsible for the balance due to the financer upon the default of the
consumer-debtor. A no-recourse arrangement means, at least nomi-
nally, that after the assignment the dealer has nothing more to do
with the two parties to the security agreement, the debtor and the
financer, and is not responsible for any loss resulting from the
consumer-debtor's default. The particular variations in the terms of
the arrangement may depend on historically accepted arrange-
ments; the customs in certain geographical areas; the relative eco-
nomic leverage of the dealer and financer, such as whether the fin-
ancer also provides inventory financing for the dealer; and the range
of activities of the financer, which may extend to other types of such
commerce or be largely restricted to the automotive products of the
manufacturer-owner of the financer, as in the cases of the captive
financers owned by General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler.
Other practical and financial considerations help determine
which version of which arrangement is selected. Several incremental
steps from one extreme to the other may be adopted as part of the
dealer agreement, which governs the usually ongoing arrangement
between dealer and financer. The financer, especially if it does busi-
ness with many dealers in the same area, is apt to be more efficient
in such matters as making credit investigations of the retail custom-
ers, giving written notices to many debtors, and repossessing cars if
necessary. In contrast, the disposition of the cars as repossessed
collateral sometimes is accomplished more easily by the dealer, es-
pecially one that also sells used cars.
For conceptual and descriptive purposes, the dealer is best con-
Ford Motor Co., No. 9073 (F.T.C. Jan. 4, 1979). The administrative judge found:
About 70 percent of Francis Ford's retail sales of motor vehicles are financed in
whole or in part. These consumer credit sales are drawn up on retail installment
contracts which are pre-printed forms supplied either by Ford Credit or by the
United States National Bank of Oregon ("U.S. Bank"). Francis Ford sells,
assigns or transfers over half of these contracts to Ford Credit, the remainder
to the U.S. Bank.
Id., slip op. § II.C 48 at 7 (citation omitted). The FTC largely upheld the decision of the
administrative judge requiring that the dealer give any surplus to the customer after a repos-
sessed car is resold; the decision will apply to 20,000 car dealers throughout the country, once
they are notified. Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 1979, at 11, col. 1.
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sidered the customer of its financer. Also, the dealer is the salesman
of its financer. Not only does the dealer sell, so to speak, the finan-
cer's money to finance the sale, but quite often the dealer also sells
insurance to the customer. The insurance sold includes collision
insurance on the car and, less frequently, liability insurance, as well
as insurance on the life, health, and earning ability of the consumer-
debtor. Credit life insurance is usually a reducing-term policy avail-
able at regulated but high rates, and credit accident and health
insurance policies provide for the debtor's installment payments to
be made during that individual's illness or other physical inability
to work.' On all the insurance transactions, the dealer is paid a
commission of 30% to 40% of the premium paid by the retail buyerA
If the insurance is financed, with the loan for the purchase of the
car increased accordingly to pay the insurance premiums, the dealer
also may get a commission on the financing, a percentage of the
total finance charge, perhaps calculated separately from that for the
car-sale financing. The dealer acts as an agent in selling the insur-
ance. The commission on the finance charge is termed a kickback
or a reserve rebate, depending on one's point of view. Paid to the
dealer by its financer or sometimes by the insurer, this commission
is usually the largest and most important source of a dealer's earned
income. It is fair to say that, for most car dealers, more money is
earned on the financing than on the sale of the car, and without
these commissions many dealers could not make enough profit to
stay in business. 0
8. The Deputy Administrator of the Federal Insurance Administration estimated that the
"rates for credit insurance are four to 10 times higher than for life or health insurance sold
by insurance agents." Jones, Your Money: Credit Insurance Costs at Issue, N.Y. Times, May
19, 1979, at 30, col. 1.
9. Francis Ford was paid commissions of "between 35 percent and 37 V2 percent on its sales
of [credit life, accident, and health] insurance." Ford Motor Co., No. 9073, slip op. § IL.E
at 12 (F.T.C. Jan. 4, 1979).
10. The difference between the retail customer's interest rate and that charged to the
dealer for purposes of the rebate is usually enough so that the dealer gets 30% or more. Thus,
if the total finance charge is, say, 10% add-on to a net loan of $4,000, or $1,200 for a typical
three-year loan, the dealer's rebate will be about $400. That is ordinarily much more than
the profit on a cash sale. The FTC administrative law judge understated the situation when
he commented, "Finance and insurance income may be a major [source of profiti for a
dealership." Id., slip op. § .E at 12 (citation omitted).
Some figures on Francis Ford's operations may be illustrative as they are probably fairly
typical of larger automobile dealers.
1979]
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THE LEGAL MODEL AT A LOWER LEVEL
The retail-installment financing of cars, especially if done in suffi-
cient volume, is a profitable business with a relatively low rate of
default. Therefore, manufacturers want not only to sell cars but also
to finance the sale of those cars. Dealers need an inventory of cars
to display for sale; manufacturers, through their captive financers,
provide financing for that inventory." Although inventory financing
is not as profitable to the automobile manufacturers as retail-sales
financing, it is necessary to promote retail sales. The dealer also
needs inventory financing to sell cars and insurance by'retail-
installment sales so that it can earn commissions, which may consti-
tute its largest source of income.
These ends are accomplished by a variety of contractual relation-
ships at or between the extremes of full recourse and no recourse to
the dealer by the financer in the event of the consumer-debtor's
default. Although the frequency of default by retail customers is
usually less than 3%, the totals are large.' 2 The amount of fairly
short-term automobile consumer credit (36 to 48 months) is so large
that even a small percentage amounts to hundreds of millions of
dollars.' 3 Therefore, what happens on default is a significant prob-
lem affecting large numbers of individuals.
1974 1975
Pretax Profits $112,406 $ 18,934
Finance and Insurance
Commissions $127,827 $124,407
Id., slip op. §§ Il.A at 4, II.E at 12.
11. "Goods are. . .(4) 'inventory' if they are held by a person who holds them for sale or
lease or to be furnished under contracts of service or if he has so furnished them, or if they
are raw materials, work in process or materials used or consumed in the business." U.C.C. §
9-109(4).
12. The rate of delinquency on consumer credit loans has not exceeded 3% in the postwar
years. During most of 1978 about 2.5% of outstanding consumer credit was delinquent for 30
days or more. Wall St. J., July 21, 1978, at 32, col. 2. GMAC, with a default rate of 2.5%,
actually repossessed in less than one-half of 1% of its automobile accounts. G.M.A.C., CREDIT
PRACTICES COMMENTS: STATEMENT SUBMITTED TO F.T.C. 5 AUGUST 1977, at 5 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as G.M.A.C. COMMENTS].
Perhaps a million or more cars a year are repossessed. F.T.C., REPORT OF THE PRESIDING
OFFICER ON PROPOSED TRADE REGULATION RULE: CREDIT PRACTIcEs, § V.A.1 at 206 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT OF PRESIDING OFFICER], citing F.T.C., STAFF REPORT 294 (1975).
13. New auto credit extended in March and April 1979 reached $7.8 and $7.72 billion,
respectively. Wall St. J., June 7, 1979, at 4, col. 3.
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After default and the usual self-help repossession, all kinds of
variations in creditors' remedies are available." Under UCC § 9-504,
the secured party or its assignee must give notice to the debtor and
accomplish what is termed a reasonable disposition of the car as
collateral by some lawful type of sale. 5 If the car is sold for less than
the balance due, the creditor is entitled to a deficiency judgment;
if the car is sold for more than the balance due on the original
installment-sale contract, the consumer-debtor is to'be paid that
surplus."6 There is an ongoing dispute regarding the reasonable costs
14. Under the Code, the secured party, upon default, may repossess the car "without
judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace." U.C.C. § 9-503. To avoid
breaching the peace when repossessing usually means it must be done by stealth and at night.
In the District of Columbia study, it appeared from the police blotter that 95% of the reposses-
sions occurred between midnight and six o'clock in the morning. Comment, Business As
Usual, supra note 6, at 532 n.A3. In some areas and perhaps for some secured creditors,
voluntary surrender of the car by the debtor is more common than ordinary repossession.
Several constitutional challenges to self-help repossession have been mounted based on an
alleged taking of the debtor's property without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard
before the repossesion. These have been rejected on the ground of lack of state action or
significant state involvement. See, e.g., Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir.
1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1974).
15. See note 4 suprq. The Code requires notice to the debtor before the car or other
collateral is disposed of, except in certain cases. "[R]easonable notification of the time and
place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or
other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the
debtor.. . ." U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
What is proper notice has been the subject of byzantine analyses in a spate of reported
cases. See Siegel, The Commercially Reasonable Disposition of Collateral, 80 COMM. L.J. 67,
68-69 (1975). This seems to be one of the few areas in which judges have been able to seize
upon technicalities to help the consumer-debtor without rejecting the UCC out of hand. As
fast as the appellate opinions are published, however, lawyers representing dealers and finan-
cers advise their clients of appropriate changes in their forms as well as in their practices of
notice and disposition by resale of the motor vehicles as repossessed collateral. Hence, there
is apt to be less litigation unless state statutory laws are changed or the proposed F.T.C.
Credit Practices Rule is adopted.
In one of several recent articles, the authors state that courts have disagreed on virtually
every aspect of repossession and what constitutes a commercially reasonable resale of the
collateral. Hudak & Turnbull, The Standard of Reasonableness in the Sale of Repossessed
Collateral Under the U C. C., 4 W. ST. U.L. REv. 22, 23 (1976). See also Reed, Anatomy of a
Deficiency Action: A Case History in Recovery of Deficiency Balance After Repossession of
an Automobile, 82 COMM. L.J. 37 (1977).
16. "If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party must account to
the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, debtor is liable for any deficiency."
U.C.C. § 9-504(2). At least two opposing rules of law have grown up as to the creditor's right
to a deficiency if he fails to give proper notice. One theory precludes any deficiency judgment,
while the other permits a deficiency judgment if the creditor bears the burden of proving that
"the fair and reasonable value of the [car was] credited to the debtor's account." Conti
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associated with repossessing, storing, and preparing a car for resale
and the sales commission to be paid on resale of the repossessed
car. 
7
The FTC has held hearings on a proposed credit practices rule.',
Like some state statutes, the rule addresses the problems resulting
from the "two-sale" practices of many dealers and financers. The
first resale after repossession is in something like a wholesale mar-
ket.'I The buyer, often one of the financer's dealers or the original
seller-dealer, pays a price that is usually somewhat less than the
wholesale value of the car as given in the standard guidebooks of
values. These guidebooks are tables that record thousands of recent
sales for use in the trade by dealers and financers as well as by many
taxing authorities for assessment of personal property and transfer
taxes. Wholesale and retail values of cars appear according to time
of year (month or quarter), geographical area, and either condition
of the car or mileage, sometimes both. They also allow for optional
equipment.20
Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 386, 276 A.2d 402, 404-05 (Queen's County
Ct. 1971), aff'd, 118 N.J. Super. 521, 288 A.2d 872 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972). See also
Randolph v. Franklin Inv. Co., 398 A.2d 340, 347-48 nn.11, 12 (D.C. 1979) and cases cited
therein.
17. Under the Code, the secured creditor may charge "reasonable expenses . . . incurred
in the custody, preservation, use or operation of the collateral" when the collateral is in the
secured party's possession. U.C.C. § 9-2 07 (2)(a). Once the car is resold, the proceeds of the
sale may be kept by the secured party as needed to reimburse himself for "the reasonable
expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale or lease, selling, leasing and the like and, to
the extent provided for in the agreemeet and not prohibited by law, the reasonable attorneys'
fees and legal expenses incurred by the 'secured party'." U.C.C. § 9-504(1)(a).
18. The text of Proposed Trade Regulation Rule: Credit Practices is at 40 Fed. Reg. 16,347
(1975). If approved, it will be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 444. See note 35 infra.
19. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the private sale of the car by the financer back
to the dealer from which it originally took the security agreement by assignment is not a
"disposition" of the car when the arrangement specified full recourse. Therefore, when the
debtor defaults and the financer sells the car back to the original seller-the dealer-under a
full-recourse contract, the Code's provisions as to the reasonableness of the sale do not apply.
However, the price received does not affect the customer-debtor anyway because the dealer
again becomes the secured party, and it is the price the dealer gets when it resells that will
determine the amount with which the customer will be credited.
The relevant Code section provides:
A person who is liable to a secured party under a guaranty, indorsement, repur-
chase agreement or the like and who receives a transfer of collateral from the
secured party or is subrogated to his rights has thereafter the rights and duties
of the secured party. Such a transfer of collateral is not a sale or disposition of
the collateral under this Article.
U.C.C. § 9-504(5).
20. The guidebooks are briefly summarized in the REPORT OF THE PRESIDING OFFICER, supra
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That "sale" ordinarily is a lawful disposition of the collateral
within most judicial interpretations of the UCC § 9-504, despite the
below-wholesale price paid for the car, which provides the legal
basis for a deficiency judgment against the consumer-debtor. The
second resale is made by the first "buyer"-usually, as indicated, a
dealer with whom the financer does business or the original seller-
dealer. Ordinarily, the dealer then sells to a retail buyer at a price
that closely approximates the retail value given in the standard
guidebooks. Often the first resale from the financer-repossessor to
the dealer that originally sold the car is not a sale in the conven-
tional meaning of that term, and the Code does not view it as a sale
governed by article 9.21 If the dealer agreement is with recourse, the
dealer is compelled to assume liability to the financer for the bal-
ance due on the secured loan. The dealer then resells the car in the
usual manner in which used cars are marketed-either on the lot or
at public auction.
Dealers and financers claim that part or all of the disparity be-
tween the resale prices and the guidebook retail and wholesale val-
ues is due to the poor condition of the car at repossession and time
of the first sale. 22 The considerable increase in the price at the sec-
ond resale, relative to the first resale and to the guidebook values
of retail prices, is said to be due to repairs and preparation of the
car, which enable the car to be resold in the retail market in some-
thing like the ordinary course of business for used-car dealers.
Whether all these costs exist in fact, how they are calculated, and
which are properly chargeable to the second resale of the car are the
subject of much disagreement.
Under the Code, the proceeds of the second, or retail, resale may
be applied first to the various expenses incurred by the creditor: the
reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale, and
selling the car, including attorneys' fees and legal expenses. Because
all these may be deducted from the gross proceeds of the sale ac-
cording to § 9-504, even if the second sale is the basis for calculation,
a deficiency easily can be created where the consumer-debtor would
otherwise not owe anything and even might, in some cases, be enti-
tled to a surplus.
note 12, § V.A.3 at 214 & n.44.
21. See note 19 supra.
22. See REPORT OF THE PRESMING OFFICER, suppa note 12, § V.A.4.2 at 224-27.
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This is also true, of course, when the financer, be it a bank or one
of the manufacturers' captive finance companies, has no recourse
against the dealer and must sell the car itself. Because financers
ordinarily do not have used-car lots, they contend that they must,
as in fact they usually do, resell the car in a wholesale market. Given
that the maximum gross price that can be realized is apt to be the
wholesale value of the car, a deficiency almost always is created
even before deduction of the legally allowable expenses associated
with the repossession and resale.?
Most states do not require that the resale be in the ordinary
manner of the retail market, even though the consumer purchased
and financed his purchase in the retail market. The resale can be
to a wholesale buyer and in a wholesale market provided, in general
terms, that the secured party tries to "obtain the best possible
price" under the circumstances. 24 What that requirement means in
a particular transaction can be decided only by a lawsuit, which
nearly always costs the consumer-debtor more than he gains.
Several states have a variant on the UCC model termed "election
of remedies." Often restricted to consumer transactions, these laws
allow the creditor a choice between two exclusive modes: resale after
repossession or a suit on the underlying obligation. If the creditor
repossesses the car, he cannot obtain a deficiency judgment against
the consumer-debtor when the car is resold for less than the balance
due. Retaking of the car, which amounts to what is termed "strict
foreclosure," is deemed full satisfaction of the debt. In its basic
form, an election of remedies statute provides that the secured cred-
itor has the option of retaking the property that secured the loan,
thus extinguishing the debt, or suing on the promissory note.2 If the
creditor elects to sue the consumer-debtor on the promissory note,
which is part of the security agreement, he usually obtains a default
23. However, the costs associated with wholesale resales, at least on a large scale, are apt
to be much less than for a retail disposition. See Shuchman, supra note 6, at, 46 & n.99.
24. Vic Hansen & Sons v. Crowley, 57 Wis. 2d 106, 111-12, 203 N.W.2d 728, 731 (1973).
25. A typical such statute is the Connecticut Retail Installment Sales Financing Act (codi-
fied in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-83, et seq. (West 1960 & Supp. 1979)).
The holder [creditor] may seek a monetary judgment on the contract against
the buyer unless the goods have been repossessed, with or without judicial
process. Goods purchased under the contract [security agreement] shall not be
executed upon to satisfy such judgment. When such judgment becomes final,
the holder's [creditor's] security interest in the goods shall be extinguished.
Id. § 42-98 (West Supp. 1979).
[Vol. 21:15
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judgment by reason of the debtor's failure to appear and defend.26
Then the creditor may issue a writ of execution and levy on and sell
any nonexempt property of the debtor, including execution process
against the debtor's wages by garnishment orders entered against
the debtor's employer. Under most such laws, however, the judg-
ment creditor who elects to sue on the promissory note cannot have
execution against the collateral itself, the car.
From empirical data on some of the practices under these differ-
ent legal procedures, it appears that the UCC model grinds out
deficiencies as the most common, if not routine, result. In contrast,
some evidence indicates that reasonably efficient resales in a retail
market would result in very few deficiencies27 and even some sur-
pluses for the debtor.2 Where election of remedies is the applicable
legal doctrine, repossession takes place far more often than suits on
the promissory note. 29 Most repossessions under an election of reme-
dies statute end the matter as far as the consumer-debtor is con-
cerned because, if there is a deficiency upon resale, he is not obliged
to make it up, and if there is a surplus, he does not get it.39
The UCC being the prevailing model, repossessions followed by
deficiency judgments are the most common result when a consumer
defaults on car payments. The empirical studies cited bear this
out." These studies plus several "horribles"-cases in which a court
26. In the Connecticut study, 74 defaults constituted 95% of the 78 known cases. Shuch-
man, supra note 6, at 38, table 3 n.a. In the District of Columiba study, 276 judgments in a
284-case sample (95%) were obtained by default. Comment, Business As Usual, supra note
6, at 522 n.59.
27. See note 31 infra.
28. See Ford Motor Co., No. 9073, slip op. § ll.G at 25-26 (F.T.C. Jan. 4, 1979).
29. The explanation for this phenomenon is that the prudent financer will try to arrange
the down payment and the terms of the loan so that the balance due is always less than the
depreciated value of the car. Therefore, if the financer sues on the note, it gets only the
balance due, but if it repossesses the car, it gets collateral worth more than the debt. In
addition, the costs of a lawsuit and the possibility that the judgment against the defaulting
debtor may not be collectible both weigh against the choice of suing on the underlying
obligation.
30. That may change, although predicting the impact of judicial and administrative deci-
sions is not something the prudent legal scholar should make book on. The administrative
judge's order requiring the dealer involved, Francis Ford, "to cease and desist from failing to
pay to defaulting customers surpluses which it realizes on the resale of repossessed vehicles,"
Ford Motor Co., No. 9073, slip op. § Il.F. at 41 (F.T.C. Jan. 4, 1979), was upheld by the full
Commission. Wall St. J., Oct. 10, 1979, at 11, col. 1. The FTC ruling that Francis Ford
"has to pay customers any surplus it receives from the sale of a repossessed car" will apply
to "the nation's 20,000 car dealers once they are notified." Id.
31. Two charts prepared by student editors as part of a student symposium compare the
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of record wrote an opinion based on findings of fact that the resale
price was much lower than market value32 -have led to increased
concern that the consumer is not being treated fairly.
three empirical studies. The writers conclude that the results are about the same in Connecti-
cut, the District of Columbia, and California: "[A]fter the secured party repossesses the
vehicle, the first resale is ordinarily made at a subwholesale price to a dealer," and a defi-
ciency judgment is obtained for the remainder of the debt. Student Symposium on the
Proposed F. T. C. Rule on Credit Practices, 8 CONN. L. REV. 457, 459 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Student Symposium].
First Resale Second Resale
Asa%of Asa %of
As a % of Wholesale Retail
Retail Price Price Price
Connecticut 51% 71% 92%
Washington, D.C. 62% 81% 110%
California 64% 84%
The authors pointed out that, had the first resales, which formed the bases for the defi-
ciency judgments, been at retail, most of the consumer-debtor's obligations would have been
satisfied, and possibly even surpluses would have been produced. Id. at 460. This point was
perhaps implicitly rejected in Ford Motor Co., No. 9073 (F.T.C. Jan. 4, 1979).
Percentage of Creditor's Claim Satisfied
By Actual First Resale Had First Resale Been at Retail
Connecticut 51% 1086%
Washington, D.C. 65% 105%
California 729 108%
Student Symposium, supra, at 460.
32. E.g., Credit Bureau Metro, Inc. v. Mims, 45 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 12, 119 Cal. Rptr. 622
(1975); Tauber v. Johnson, 8 Ill. App. 3d 789, 291 N.E.2d 180 (1972); Coronett v. White Motor
Corp., 109 Neb. 496, 209 N.W.2d 341 (1973); Atlas Construction Co. v. Dravo-Doyle Co., 3
U.C.C. Rep. 124 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas, Allegheny County 1965).
Various legal-aid groups related examples of unreported "horribles" at the hearing on the
proposed FTC rule.
A car was sold on March 7 at a cash price of $1,156. Following repossession in
September, it was [relsold for only $50. A vehicle purchased for $2,572 in June
was resold in November for $666. A new car purchased on October 24, 1975, at
a deferred payment price of $6,786 was resold on December 17, 1975, following
its repossession, for $3,100. A used car was bought on September 20, 1975, for
$1,970, repossessed on December 3, 1975, and [re]sold for $330.
REPORT OF THE PRESIDING OFFICER, supra note 12, § V.A.3 at 219 (footnotes omitted).
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WHAT EVERY CREDITOR KNOWS: THE "ROUGH" CONDITION OF
REPOSSESSED CARS
The most frequent legal defense, and the strongest response to
proposed legislation and rulemaking to ameliorate what seems to be
an inequitable legal process, is the argument that repossessed cars
are in poor condition. The most recent example is the hearings on
the proposed FTC Credit Practices Rule; the transcripts are replete
with assertions that repossessed cars are "dogs," fit only for the
junkyard or, at best, for a third-rate used-car lot. The persons whose
cars are repossessed, it is claimed, failed to maintain them and did
not provide the minimum of care, thus "burning them out," in the
colorful argot of the business. One is informed in the most graphic
manner, sometimes literally so with actual photographs,3 3 that re-
possessed cars are consistently nearly worthless, which accounts for
the overwhelming number of deficiencies. 34 The FTC's Proposed
Trade Regulation Rule on Credit Practices would require, in part,
that a consumer whose car has been repossessed by a financer or
dealer be credited with the fair-market retail value of the car.3 5 Only
33. In a study by GMAC of 46 repossessions at 4 locations, insurance adjusters employed
by its wholly owned subsidiary insurance company, CIM Insurance Corporation, estimated
the values of the 46 repossessed cars. G.M.A.C. COMMENTS, supra note 12, at 13-14. Photo-
graphs were provided by GMAC for the FTC of these 46 repossessed cars, as well as a listing
of the insurable and noninsurable damage and the reconditioning required. Id. app., Exhibit
A-2.
34. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDING OFFICER, supra note 12, § V.A.4.a at 224-25 & nn.91-100.
GMAC claimed:
During the period prior to repossession the car typically is not maintained. It
is abused, littered, scratched, stained, tom and often banged up. In many in-
stances, equipment such as radios and stereo units are stripped from the vehicle.
Other equipment such as tires and wheels are removed or replaced with inferior
equipment.
G.M.A.C. COMMENTS, supra note 12, at 11.
35. Section 444.2(a)(7) of the proposed FTC rule would require:
In connection with the extension of credit to consumers in or affecting com-
merce,. . . it is an unfair trade act or practice . .. for a lender or retail install-
ment seller directly or indirectly: (a) To take or receive from a consumer an
obligation which: .. .(7) Fails to provide that if the creditor retakes encum-
bered property from the consumer, the fair market retail value of the property
so taken will be credited toward the balance due under the obligation; ...
40 Fed. Reg. 16,347 (1975).
Some state laws define fair-market value. The Connecticut statue, which is restricted to
motor vehicles, creates a presumption that the fair-market value of a -repossessed car "shall
be one-half of the sum of the average trade-in value [presumably the wholesale value] plus
the average retail value of such motor vehicle as stated in the National Automobile Dealers
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after that credit has been given is there a basis for determining
whether the fmancer is entitled to make a deficiency claim.
As part of the largely archival research to assay the basis for the
defense of consistently poor condition and the probable impact of
the proposed rule, random samples of FTC files were examined,
which had most of the following items of information: (1) condition
of the repossessed car; (2) wholesale value of the car at repossession;
(3) balance due on the loan contract; (4) expenses of repossession
and resale; (5) type of resale market, wholesale or retail; and (6)
dates. Some files had a seventh datum: whether the dealer agree-
ment was with or without recourse.
The findings were that the conditions of the sample sets of cars
describe a "normal" curve. About one-half the cars were in fair or
normal condition and about a quarter each were in poor and good
condition.
DATA SET A
The next five sections of this article contain analyses of and com-
mentary on four sets of data based on information taken from the
FTC's public records. These data, in the form of computer-
generated printings, are available for examination.36
Data Set A consists of a sample of 236 files randomly selected
from a larger group provided by General Motors Acceptance Corpo-
ration (GMAC) and on record with the FTC's Public Reference
office.3 17 All cars whose condition was noted by the GMAC repos-
sessor or other employee are included in this set. These files, from
several GMAC branch offices, were created by GMAC during the
years 1971-72.11 For Data Set A, -we conducted an independent
Association Used Car Guide, Eastern Edition, as of the date of repossession." CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 42-98(g) (West Supp. 1979). The presumption "may be rebutted only be direct
in-court testimony." Id. Other state laws, following the UCC model, leave the matter open.
A District of Columbia court rule provides: "No deficiency judgment after repossession shall
be granted unless it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court. . . that said property was
resold for a fair and reasonable price." D.C. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 55-11(b).
36. The computer printouts are available for examination at the William and Mary Law
Review.
37. See F.T.C., MEMORANDUM FOR CREDrr PRAcTIcEs, Document XI-167 (Aug. 5, 1977).
The FTC document describes most of the creations, origins, and contents of the archives from
which we took our sample of files. Data Set A files came from records provided by GMAC
directly to the Division of Special Projects, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade
Commission.
38. The listing of cases in Data Set A identifies each of the GMAC files used by either its
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check of the wholesale values listed by the National Association of
Automobile Dealers (NADA)39 to compare with those that had
been recorded by GMAC. GMAC used a form entitled "Auto-
motive Retail Repossession Statistics" to record the data. The cars
on these forms were fairly well identified for the most part; in a few
cases, we assumed the middle range of the make and year. Of these
236 files, 227 provided enough information to enable us to examine
the relationship between GMAC's recorded NADA wholesale
values and our independently verified NADA wholesale values.
For Data Set A, that relationship is shown in table I. Our inde-
pendently verified NADA wholesale values, which we used as a
benchmark, were only slightly higher than the NADA values noted
by GMAC for repossessed cars in all conditions, not a bothersome
difference. In fact, the difference which exists between the GMAC's
NADA wholesale values and our benchmark is insignificant when
we control for the condition of the car as noted by GMAC.1°
TABLE I. RELATIONSHIP OF GMAC's NADA WHOLESALE
VALUES TO INDEPENDENTLY VERIFIED NADA VALUES a
Condition of Car Mean Median
Good (N = 58) 99%o 101%
Fair (N = 108) 97% 100%
Poor (N =61) 88% 97%
Total (N = 227/236) 95% 100%
a Data Set A.
The computations in table I show the difference between our find-
ings of NADA wholesale value and those recorded by GMAC. The
values recorded by GMAC are fairly consistently lower, although
typically by a small amount. The mean GMAC-recorded NADA
wholesale value is about 95% of our benchmark check in the NADA
assigned FTC number or the GMAC contract number, which are found on the originals. All
of the other information from each of the 236 files is listed at the beginning of Data Set A.
These variables are the data base from which our calculations proceed.
39. The National Automobile Dealers Association Used Car Guides are published in var-
ious editions, such as Eastern Edition, for the different geographic areas.
40. We assumed that the NADA and Redbook values were for cars in normal condition for
that make, model, and year. Because about as many cars were in poor condition (N=63) as
in good condition (N=61), that may be considered a washout variance.
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books. The fact that the median of the difference is nearly zero-
that is, the median GMAC-recorded value is 100% of ours-
makes clear that the range of difference is insignificant. Once our
general concordance with GMAC as regards NADA wholesale
values for cars in good condition was established, we examined the
retail values as found in the NADA books for most of the cars in our
sample. GMAC did not record the NADA retail values for the auto-
mobiles. Nevertheless, given the closeness of the two sets of whole-
sale values, we have no reason to believe that, had GMAC recorded
the NADA retail values, they would have diverged by more than the
small amount that the two wholesale values differed.4'
The repossessed cars recorded by GMAC in the Data Set A files
were all resold after repossession by GMAC itself, rather than by its
dealers. This was probably because the chattel paper, establishing
the debtor's obligation and the dealer's security interest in the car,
was assigned to GMAC without recourse. Thus, upon default,
GMAC had the burden of disposing of the collateral, the dealer
having no further obligation to GMAC for the car or the secured
debt. The Code demands that the disposition of a car through resale
be conducted in a commercially reasonable manner within the
meaning of UCC § 9-507.14 All or nearly all the resales in Data Set
A were at wholesale, to others in the business of buying and selling
used cars, and not to retail buyers in the usual retail market for used
cars.
43
The condition of repossessed cars has been a matter of disagree-
ment in the literature and other discussions of the repossession-
through-resale process. 4 Obviously, the repossessor is the only party
41. Calculation of the ratio between NADA wholesale and retail values for 234 files in Data
Set A revealed that the mean of NADA wholesale values was about 77% of retail; the median
was 81%. These were all repossessed used cars.
42. The Code provides that, if the secured party disposes of the collateral in a manner that
is not commercially reasonable or otherwise fails to comply with the provisions of article 9
on disposition of repossessed collateral, the debtor "has a right to recover from the secured
party any loss caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of this Part." U.C.C. § 9-
507(1).
43. If some of these resales were in the retail market, the data that follow suggests that
GMAC's manner of disposition is so inadequate and inefficient as to be more unconscionable
than our data indicate.
44. For example, the American Bankers Association criticized the Connecticut study by
the author cited in note 6, supra. Several grounds were given for the criticism, two of which,
in particular, were later widely repeated by the industry. (1)The sample of 83 complete cases
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that can record this information for a set of repossessed cars. Very
few courts have directly addressed the condition of the repossessed
car, either as a factor m addition to scrutiny of the formalities in
determining whether a sale was reasonable or as an entirely separate
substantive issue. The crucial matter of the market value of the car
is determined by looking at whether the purely formal procedural
mechanisms were followed, the result of which is then defined as the
market value of the car, that is, what a buyer will actually pay 15
The information provided by GMAC on forms given to the FTC
can be used as a data base for assaying the actual condition of
repossessed cars. These forms contain several important and in-
formative items. In particular, each form has a valuable datum-
the "condition of the collateral [i.e., the car] when repossessed,"
as that was recorded by the GMAC employee or agent who repos-
sessed the car. Our sample, using 236 of the files that contain
this datum, revealed that three labels were used to categorize the
condition of the repossessed cars: good, fair, and poor. We took
"fair" as being equivalent to "average" condition in the NADA
guidebook.
TABLE II. CoNDrrIoN OF CARS (SPREAD) a
Condition Number of Cars
Good 61
Fair 112
Poor 63
Total 236
aData Set A.
was too small. "The rawest neophite m statistics could only discard such numbers as insuffi-
cient to warrant credence." (2)The condition of repossessed cars is very bad. "Another major
item that results in lower values is general wear, tear and abuse. Anyone in the automobile
finance business will attest that when a man even suspects that he might lose his car by
repossession, care and maintenance of the car then becomes a matter of his least concern."
Federal Role in Consumer Affairs: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Executive Reorganiza-
tion and Government Research of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 225 (1970).
45. Some observers believe that only the result of a well-advertised auction sale open to
all buyers can determine the fair-market value, retail or wholesale, of any particular car for
any purpose. For these observers, the market value can be defined as that price at which a
sale is made between informed and willing, not coerced, buyers and sellers. Although in
theory this definition holds for any specific transaction, m practice virtually everyone in-
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Table II shows how symmetrically these figures are distributed.
An important finding is that nearly three-fourths of these cars, that
is, 173 of 236, or 73%, were in fair or good condition. Because ex-
tremes may be taken as more or less offsetting each other, the fact
that equal proportions of cars were in good and poor condition also
is significant. In addition, table Ill shows that, for 56 repossessed
cars in Data Set A recorded as in good condition, the resale yielded
a mean of 92% and a median of 96% of the wholesale value. How-
ever, the resales obviously produced a smaller percentage of the
NADA retail value. For example, the resales of the 61 good-
condition cars yielded a mean of only 75% of NADA retail value and
a median of only 78%.
In any specific litigated case, the factual question of the condition
of the car at repossession is often reducible to a conflict in testimony
between the consumer-debtor and the repossessor. This is not so in
examining a set of repossessed cars. For example, the spread of
conditions in Data Set A probably is typical of the distribution of
conditions of repossessed cars, thus affording an opportunity to look
at the repossession-resale-deficiency process in the mass. In these
cases, the repossessor, be it the dealer or financer, is ordinarily the
only party with the crucial information about the distribution of
conditions of a group of repossessed cars. The dealer is the only
party with exclusive access to the information and thus as an
interested party is suspect when it claims that most repossessed
cars are in terrible condition. The particular importance of Data
Set A is that a sample of this size, taken from 117 different dealers
in several states, is very apt to be fairly representative of repossessed
cars, including those in our other three sets of data. These statistics,
then, tend to refute the repeated contention of financers and dealers
that repossessed cars are "dogs," cars in poor condition that have
not been well maintained.
When we examined separately the efficiency of the resale process
for cars in good, fair, and poor condition, the results, as seen in table
III, showed that GMAC did proportionately better by the consumer
for cars in good condition than for cars not as well maintained.
valved in automobile sales-dealers, financers, and insurance carriers-uses one or more of
the guidebooks in day-to-day business. This is also true of the wholesale auctions at which
only dealers may buy and sell. Those in attendance use the guidebook values as their stan-
dard. Similarly, many taxing authorities use the guidebooks to determine the personal-
property value, or range of values, of used cars.
[Vol. 21:15
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TABLE III. RELATIONSHIpa OF RESALn PRICE TO NADA
VALuES, ACCORDING TO CONDITION OF CARb
Resale Price As a
Percentage of ... Good Fair Poor Total
NADA Wholesale Value 92% [96%] 78% [80%] 67% [65%] 79% [84%]
As Recorded by GMAC
(N=56/61)c (N=106/112) (N=52/63) (N=214/236)
NADA Retail Value 75% [78%] 63% [63o] 47% [38%] 63% [65%]
As Independently
Verified
(Our Benchmark) (N=61/61) (N=101/112) (N-45/63) (N=207/236)
a Mean relationship, in percent, of resale price to NADA prices; medians are
in brackets.
b Data Set A.
c Ratio of number of ears in a particular condition for which full information
was available so they could be included in this table to total number of cars in
that particular condition.
GMAC's resale process, then, appears to work better proportion-
ately for good-condition cars, its efficiency in some manner related
to the condition of the car. The rule seems to be that the better the
car, the better the resale price; the worse the car, the relatively
worse the resale price. The effect of this on the consumer was direct:
He was less likely to owe a deficiency because the resale price of
good-condition cars also repossessed represented a higher percent-
age of the principal balance owed by the consumer to the secured
creditor, GMAC. 5 Data Set A shows that the actual resale prices
cr~dited to the consumer-debtor by GMAC were substantially
lower than the principal balance owed at the time of repossession.
The resale price averaged only slightly over half of the balanced
owed. The mean was 58% and the median, 59%. For the 213 cars in
Data Set A with the necessary information, we conclude that
Resale PricePRi pale B ace = 58% (N= 213/236).Principal Balance
46. "GROSBAL" is our acronym for "gross balance." It is used by GMAC to stand for
the principal balance owed by the consumer. This figure is shown in the upper right-hand
comer of the GMAC forms on record with the FTC.
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More than half of these sample files showed a resale price ranging
between 40% and 70% of the balance owed on the principal. The
resale process, then, consistently produced a deficit that was sub-
stantial as a percentage of the amount of money owed by the de-
faulting consumer-debtor. Broken down by condition of car, table
IV shows the relationship between the resale price and the principal
balance due.47
TABLE IV a RELATIONSHIP b OF RESALE PRICE TO BALANCE OWED ON
PRINCIPAL ACCORDING TO CONDITION OF CARC
Good Fair Poor Total
67% [66%] 58% [58%] 49% [45%] 58% [59%]
(N=59/61) (N=106/112) (N=48/63) (N=213/236)
a Variance 22.
b Relationship is shown as percentage representing mean; median is in
brackets.
c Data Set A.
Where GMAC had recorded the expenses of repossession and re-
sale, we gathered those data. We eliminated from our calculations
all files in which no repossession or resale expenses were incurred
or noted. Any cars voluntarily surrendered by being brought into
GMAC or a dealership by the debtor, thus entailing no repossession
expenses, are not reflected in our calculations. In addition, resales
accomplished with no resale expenses to speak of, for example,
merely by a few telephone calls to dealers, also were eliminated and
therefore are not reflected in our calculations. There may have been
an expense in either or both of these steps in some cases, but these
cases could not be included in our figures where those expenses were
not recorded in the GMAC files. Therefore, our calculations of the
expenses of repossession and resale are apt to be higher than they
actually are in a sizeable set of routine cases.
For 175 of the 236 files sampled that contained information on the
expense of repossession, the mean expense was about $48. The mean
of the resale expense in 202 of the 236 cases was about $96. The
47. It is merely an artifact of our data that the figures in table IV for all cars and those for
fair-condition cars are almost exactly the same. The closeness of the figures is due to the
"normality" of the distribution of conditions of the repossessed cars in our Data Set A
sample files.
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medians were much lower, $45 and $13, respectively. These figures,
as explained, are subject to the qualification that zero values have
been eliminated. As table V shows for Data Set A, there is consider-
able variation according to the condition of the car. The total expen-
ses of resale, whatever they may have included, were apt to be
higher for cars in poor condition-a mean of $144 and a median of
$70-than for cars in good condition, for which the mean was $99
and the median, $48. The expenses of repossession also were sub-
stantially greater for cars in poor condition than for those in good
and fair condition.
TABLE V. RELATIONSHIP a OF REPOSSESSION AND RESAE
EXPENSES OF CONDITION OF CARb
Type of Expenses Good Fair Poor Total
Resale $99 [$48] $69 [$35] $144 [$70] $96 [$45]
(N=54/61)c (N=96/112) (N=52/64) (N=202/236)
Repossession $33 [$10] $37 [$9] $82 [$27] $48 [$13]
(N=42/61) (N=84/112) (N=49/63) (N=175/236)
a The mean expense is given first; the median expense is in brackets.
b Data Set A.
e The first number represents those cars in this particular condition that were
included because the relevant expenses were incurred and recorded by GMAC;
the second number represents the total number of cars that were in this particu-
lar condition.
CONCLUSIONS ON DATA SET A
The process from repossession through disposition of the car as
collateral as revealed by tables I through V, can be summarized in
the following manner:
First, GMAC recorded the condition of the cars at about the date
of repossession.
Second, GMAC recorded the resale price of the car and the NADA
wholesale value at the date of resale. (Resale is the disposition of
the collateral within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code
and its various state statutory supplements.)
Third, the length of time between repossession and resale was not
so great as to change the NADA wholesale and retail values and thus
make the calculated ratios at repossession and resale significantly
different. Based on 78 of the 236 files in Data Set A, that is, roughly
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every third case, the mean time elapsed between repossession and
resale was 38 days. The range was, of course, greater, but most of
the resales took place 30 to 50 days after repossession. Even for a
car sold new a year before, a delay of a month or so makes little
difference in its selling price during the second year of the car's life.
The time lapse has even less effect on the price of older cars, which
includes cars originally sold and financed as used cars. For nearly
all cars, the depreciation is greatest during the first year, less during
the second year, and so forth. Presumably, one could do the neces-
sary calculations on a sample of quoted values to describe a general
depreciation curve." Absent that approximation, I conjecture that
the monthly depreciation rate starts rapidly and then slows up,
approaching, but not reaching, a flat curve.49
Fourth, GMAC resold the repossessed cars for less than two-thirds
of the NADA retail value and for about three-quarters of the NADA
wholesale value. This varied somewhat with the condition of the car
for some unexplained reason. Repossessed cars in good condition
were resold for about nine-tenths, or 92%, of the wholesale value and
three-fourths, 75%, of the retail value. In contrast, cars in poor
condition were sold for about two-thirds, or 67%, of wholesale value
and less than half, or 47%, of retail value.
Fifth, the effect of these practices on consumer-debtors was that
they were faced with paying the deficiencies the system ground out,
and any possible surpluses that might have been paid to them was
eliminated.
With three empirical studies that are generally consistent with
these data already published in law journals, the figures no longer
are shocking. 0 But the message they carry of basic unfairness to the
defaulting consumer-debtor has lost none of its bite.
48. This was done some years back, but it was too long ago and in too limited a manner
for present use. The American Bankers Association showed depreciation, or reduction in
wholesale value, in a generally concave curve that would be similar to my construct. See
CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER
FINANCE 275 (1972). The calculations included comprehensive and collision insurance. It is
unclear whether their comparison of wholesale value, as it relates to the balance due on
principal debt, provided for a down payment.
49. When the car gets old enough, its value may begin to rise for reasons such as the
discontinuance of that model-as, for example, the Cadillac convertible-or because the older
model does Aot require equipment needed in later models to conform with emission and safety
requirements or because the car is old enough to qualify as an antique.
50. See note 6 supra.
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DATA SET B
Data Set B consists of 148 files obtained by the FTC for the years
1974 and 1975. These files come from 18 different dealers in widely
separated geographic areas, as well as from financers owned by all
three major car manufacturers and other financers, including
banks. Data Sets B and D both reflect recourse arrangements in
which the dealer had to undertake resale of the repossessed cars.
This contractual arrangement could account for most of the cars
having been sold at retail-123 of 148 cases, or 83%. The dealers
probably sold these cars off their used-car lots.
We do not know the conditions of these repossessed cars, but we
posited that they were about the same as those in Data Set A. Other
information in the Data Set B files, howevei, enabled us to make
most of the same calculations as for Data Set A, although we could
not provide separate calculations based on condition at reposses-
sion. Thus, we had to treat all 148 files as representing cars in fair
condition, which is nearly the exact numerical equivalent of all cars
in fair condition in Data Set A.
We know from the files in Data Set B which resales were at
wholesale and which at retail-25 and 123, respectively. In Data Set
A, however, all resales were at wholesale so far as we know, which
is why the financer-repossessor, GMAC, recorded only the NADA
wholesale values. The resale prices for Data Set B are shown sepa-
rately in table VI as functions of the proper respective standards,
NADA wholesale and NADA retail values. Just as in Data Set A,
we estimated the NADA wholesale and retail values by using infor-
mation on the make, model, and year of the car, as well as the date
of repossession. Hence, we have no reason to think that our NADA
figures diverge more from the NADA values noted by the
repossessor-resellers in Data Set B than the insignificant differ-
ences found in Data Set A, in which we had GMAC's recorded
NADA wholesale values. Table VI uses the same basis for calcula-
tions as was used for the Data Set A tables.
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TABLE VI. RELATIONSHIPa OF RESALE PRICE TO NADA VALUES
AND TO PRINCIPAL BALANCE OWED, ACCORDING TO TYPE OF RESALEb
Resale Price as a Percentage Wholesale Retail
of ... (N=25) (N=123)
NADA Wholesale Value 80%
(N=25)
Principal Balance Owed 85% 102%
(N=25) (N=32)
NADA Retail Value 90%
(N=115)
a Mean is given in percentages.
b Data Set B.
DATA SET D
Data Set D consists of a sample similar in scope to Data Set B
but slightly larger in numbers. Its 163 files include 118 retail resales,
or 72% of the total resales, and 45 wholesale resales, or 28%. The
comments on Data Set B also are applicable to D in other respects.
The same calculations that were made for Data Set B in table VI
appear in table VII for Data Set D. The results are substantially
similar.
TABLE VII. RELATIONSHIPa OF RETAIL PRICE TO NADA
VALUES AND PRINCIPAL BALANCE OWED, ACCORDING
To TYPE OF RmALEb
Resale Price as Resales at Wholesale Resales at Retail
a Percentage of . .. (N=45) (N=118)
NADA Wholesale Value 74%
(N=44/45)
Principal Balance Owed 80% 105%
(N=42/45) (N=90 118)
NADA Retail Value 91%
(N=112/118)
a Mean is given in percentages.
b Data Set D.
Most resales in Data Sets B and D were at retail. The results were
good for the consumer-debtors, which points up the anticipated
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impact of the proposed FTC rule.5" In 32 known cases from Data Set
B, the mean of the proceeds of the sale exceeded the principal bal-
ance due. The resale proceeds were equal to 102% of the principal
balance owed by the consumer-debtor. In 115 known cases, the
resale price was nine-tenths of the NADA retail value. I would
guess that the proposed FTC rule would result in figures similar
to these. The figures in Data Set D show much the same efficiency,
as can be seen in table VII. Of the nearly three-quarters (72%)
of the resales that were at retail, an average of 105% of the prin-
cipal balance was realized, representing more than nine-tenths
(91%) of the NADA retail value. The proposed FTC rule is an
approximate model of these 235 retail dispositions of repossessed
cars (123 in Data Set B and 112 in D). Some surpluses and far fewer
deficiencies would have occurred in both Data Sets B and D had the
proposed rule been in effect.
DATA SET C
The 63 files that comprise Data Set C came from seven GMAC
branch offices located in metropolitan areas in seven states: At-
lanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Dallas, Indianapolis, Jacksonville, and
Memphis. These files differ from the other data sets in one regard:
the cars were slightly newer. Six-tenths of the cars in Data Set C
were only two model-years old or less. Nearly all the files were
created in 1973.
GMAC's branch offices recorded what the GMAC forms termed
"average wholesale value." We took that to be the NADA wholesale
value, although for these purposes it makes little difference. The
results, using GMAC's "average wholesale value" as recorded, con-
firmed fairly well the usual and consistent pattern. The type of
resale was specified on the GMAC's forms. Of 63 sales, 7 were retail
sales, making up 11% of the total, and 55, or 89%, were wholesale
resales.
51. See note 35 supra.
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TABLE VIII. RELATIONSHIP a OF RESALE PRICE TO
"AVERAGE WHOLESALE VALUE" AND PRINCIPAL BALANCE
OWED, ACCORDING TO TYPE OF REsALEb
Resale Price as a Resales at Resales at Total
Percentage of . . . Retail Wholesale Resales
"Average Wholesale Value"
As Noted By GMAC 81% 81%
(N=55) (N=62)
Principal Balance Owed 64.5% 57% 58%
(N=4/7) (N=54/55) (N-58/62)
a Mean is expressed as percentage.
b Data Set C.
The resale prices as a percentage of average retail values, had
these latter been recorded by GMAC, would have been less, of
course. Given our estimates, we conclude that
Resale Price
NADA Retail = about 62%.
PROBLEMS WITH THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
In general, we are not dealing with venal businessmen engaged in
unlawful practices. Much of the testimony before the presiding offi-
cer during the FTC's public hearings related to whether financers
and dealers as repossessors act lawfully; the testimony indicates
that most of them do conform to the applicable law. But that ap-
proach is mistaken, for it is in fact the lawful practices permitted,
those aspects of resale usually not even addressed by these laws,
that are so unfair to the consumer as a debtor in default.
A car purchased and financed at retail, including the financing
of several kinds of insurance, can be sold after repossession in a
wholesale market because state law and the UCC do not prohibit
this explicitly. The retail resale, although it is conducted with
rather less than the usual marketplace efficiency, seems to put a
lesser burden on the consumer,-debtor. GMAC, which is the largest
national financer of cars, as repossessor-reseller gets less than even
wholesale value, only about four-fifths of NADA wholesale values.
It is pointless to speak of litigation on behalf of the consumer as a
[Vol. 21:15
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protection when litigation is so expensive and the legal setting so
biased against the consumer-debtor. Thus, most such repossessions
result in no action by the consumer-debtor, not even as a response
to a later deficiency-judgment action.
What is "commercially reasonable" in a commercial setting is by
no means reasonable for, or even appropriate to, a consumer-credit
transaction. The UCC resale provisions address commercial trans-
actions. The mode of disposition of the collateral in a commercial
secured transaction is the subject matter of section 9-504 of the
Code. Here, however, we are dealing with a particular type of trans-
action that is so different in kind as to require a different legal
model. This transaction nearly always involves a defaulting con-
sumer who is an individual, usually of modest means, not a business
firm. Ordinarily, this individual is unaware of his or her rights. Even
were he cognizant of the legal requirements of the UCC, it would
avail him little, if at all, because the Code is designed for a wholly
different species of secured transactions. In addition, the cost to the
consumer of litigating a particular case almost always exceeds any
recovery.
The Code provides for flexibility because so many types of secured
transactions exist, as well as hundreds of common items of collateral
in several categories-to name but a few, chattel paper, intangibles,
inventory, fixtures, leases, and equipment. The UCC assumption is
that, if a particular procedure for disposition of collateral is unrea-
sonable, the debtor can protect himself by, for example, bidding on
the collateral and even buying it, litigating to enjoin or upset the
sale, or seeking damages in an appropriate case. None of these possi-
ble debtor remedies, however, fit the cases of most of the several
hundred thousand motor vehicles annually repossessed from de-
faulting consumer-debtors. Many of these vehicles are resold in
manners that, with remarkable consistency, produce returns that
are less than the wholesale values of the cars and far less than the
retail values. Aiticle 9 of the UCC has been described accurately as
a "deficiency judgment machine" in these consumer transactions. 2
State and federal judges, on the whole, are bound to apply a
commercial code to these noncommercial secured loans. For some
time it has been evident that the UCC procedures are so one-sided,
52. Clark, The Foreclosing Creditor under Article 9: Perilous Pitfalls Aplenty, 8 U.C.C.
L.J. 291, 292 (1976).
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and the legal and economic situation so skewed in favor of financers
as secured parties, that the result in the mass of cases is a given: a
deficiency judgment is nearly inevitable. Thus, the Code procedures
achieve with dramatic consistency the very result the framers of the
Code sought to avoid in the commercial setting. Most consumers,
then, even if knowledgeable, must surrender to this patently unfair
treatment because they are enmeshed in a commercial code that is
unfair to them in their transactions and offers little compensation
for the cost of litigation even were they likely to succeed. The pro-
posed FTC rule would give these consumers some relief. They would
be much less likely to lose their entire investment in a car, as they
now do by the hundreds of thousands every year.
CONCLUSIONS: THE PROPOSED FTC RULE AS A SOLUTION
The proposed FTC rule does not require any repossessor to give
more credit than the actual fair-market retail value of the car.53
That value varies with the condition of the car, as well as with its
mileage, if higher or lower than normal. High or low mileage now is
allowed for in the NADA and Red Book guides, two widely used
sources of used-car values.
There is no reason to suppose that a presumption that a car is in
fair or average condition and within the bounds of normal mileage
will be unfair to the industry. Nothing in the proposed rule prevents
a showing by the debtor or creditor that the repossessed car is not
in fair or average condition for a car of that make, model, and year.
Either party can contend and attempt to prove that the repossessed
car was in good or poor condition or that the mileage was above or
below the normal range in the guidebooks. Even if, in a specific case,
it would be easier or less costly to credit the debtor with fair-market
retail value, assuming normal condition, than to litigate the issues
of condition or mileage, that is not apt to be true of any sizeable set
of such cases. Our direct data from GMAC and my inferences from
the records provided by other financers and dealers strongly suggest
that most repossessed cars are in conditions ranging from fair, or
average, to good, and that the poor-condition cars are almost offset
by the number of cars in good condition.
The proposed rule is not complicated. It is simpler and easier for
financers and dealers. It also enables the consumer-debtor to deter-
53. See note 35 supra.
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mine quickly whether he is apt to be faced with a deficiency claim.
He need only check the guidebook of quoted values used in his area
at that time. Thus, the consumer-debtor can be more nearly equal
in his information, which improves his bargaining power. If it is
sometimes necessary, as some financers contend, to resell repos-
sessed cars at wholesale, the proposed rule could be interpreted or,
if necessary, amended to accommodate resales that must be made
in a wholesale market. If the consumer by then has paid the
wholesale value of the car, the resale could be held to discharge
his obligation on the security agreement.
The proposed rule, like those of most administrative, legislative,
or judicial bodies, is a model that only sets standards. Given the
diversity of actions, settings, and parties and the fact that lawyers
and financers are ingenious, interpretations of the rule will be neces-
sary if it is adopted by the FTC or any of the states. But judges in
administrative and judicial settings at least will know that the stan-
dard to be applied to that range of activities is no longer the formal-
isms of a commercial code. Instead, they will look to the standard
of a fair substantive result produced by a relatively routine, repeti-
tive process. The outcomes should approach the standard of credit-
ing the consumer-debtor in default with the fair-market retail value
of his repossessed car.
1979]
